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Abstract
Kolodny and MacFarlane () have made a pioneering contribution to
our understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensi-
tive to evidence and information. But integrating the discussion of information-
sensitivity into the standard Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways
of capturing the relevant data without treating deontic modals as “informa-
tional modals” in their sense. I show that though one such way of capturing
the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative does not. Never-
theless I argue that we have good reasons to adopt an information-sensitive
semantics of the general type Kolodny and MacFarlane describe. Contrary
to the standard semantics, relative deontic value between possibilities some-
times depends on which possibilities are live. I develop an ordering semantics
for deontic modals that captures this point and addresses various complica-
tions introduced by integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into
the standard semantic framework. By attending to these complexities, we can
also illuminate various roles that information and evidence play in logical ar-
guments, discourse, and deliberation.
*anks to Fabrizio Cariani, Nate Charlow, Jan Dowell, Kai von Fintel, Allan Gibbard, Irene
Heim, Angelika Kratzer, Rich omason, and audiences at MIT, the  ESSLLI Student Session,
and the  Central APA deontic modals session for helpful discussion, and to anonymous review-
ers fromESSLLI and the Journal of Philosophical Logic for their valuable comments. anks especially
to Eric Swanson for extensive discussion and detailed comments on previous dras.
 Introduction
Here is a familiar picture: Morality consists of a set of imperatives. What one ought
to do is a function solely of the imperatives in force and the facts about the world.
For instance, suppose you’re in a convenience store, considering whether or not to
steal the chocolate bar that’s calling out to you. Given the facts and the imperatives
in force— for instance, Don’t steal!—it’s obvious what you ought to do: you ought
not steal the chocolate.
is type of view has a rich history. It has been articulated and defended by
normative ethicists of many stripes. Here is a representative quote:
Surely what a person ought or ought not do, what is permissible or im-
permissible for him to do, does not turn on what he thinks is or will
be the case, or even on what he with the best will in the world thinks
is or will be the case, but instead on what is the case. (T ,
pp. –)
AsPrichard puts it (thoughhe ultimately rejects this line of thought), what one ought
to do “depends [only] on the nature of the facts” (, p. ), that is, “facts about the
world, known or unknown” (L , p. ). Call deontic ‘ought’s interpreted
with respect to such facts about the relevant circumstances circumstantial ‘ought’s.
As a substantive normative matter, perhaps people likeomson are right. Even
so, language and language users are not always privy to such loy normative truths.
Even if what we ought to do is what is best (in some sense) in light of the rele-
vant external circumstances, it is well known that we can at least ask and talk about
what we ought to do in view of a certain body of evidence (information, belief,
knowledge). (Distinctions between evidence-, information-, belief-, or knowledge-
sensitive readings of ‘ought’ won’t matter for our purposes.) Deontic modals like
‘ought’ can be embedded in constructions that shi the relevant deontic standard.
Suppose Alice thinks we ought to do what’s best in light of the evidence. So some
deontic standards relevant to the evaluation of ‘we ought to ’ in () are sensitive to
what the evidence is.
() a. As far as Alice is concerned, we ought to .
See also, e.g., B /, M , M , S , H ,
R .
See, e.g., R ; P , pp. –; E , p. ; B , pp. –;
G a, pp. –, b, pp. –, , pp. –; P , p. , , ch. ;
J ; W , p. , ; K & MF , pp. –.

b. Alice thinks we ought to .
c. Given that we ought to dowhat’s best in light of the evidence, we ought
to .
We need a semantics that can interpret evidence-sensitive readings of deontic ‘ought’,
that is, talk about what we ought to do in view of the evidence. We need a semantics
that is neutral on substantive normative philosophical issues about whether what
one ought to do can turn on features of one’s epistemic position. (I will focus my
attention on weak necessity modals like ‘ought’.)
e problem is that the standard semantics for modals stemming fromAngelika
Kratzer (, ) seems to encode the normative assumptions of the familiar
picture described above. It seems to assume that deontic ‘ought’s are always cir-
cumstantial ‘ought’s. Simplifying somewhat, for Kratzer deontic modals quantify
over those possibilities, among those consistent with certain relevant circumstances,
that best approximate the deontic ideal. e standard semantics thus appears to
leave open how to interpret evidence-sensitive readings of deontic modals. (We will
characterize the standard semantics in greater detail in §.)
K & MF () have made a pioneering contribution to our
understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals and conditionals can
be sensitive to evidence and information. Ultimately they defend a non-standard
semantics according to which the calculation of a set of deontically ideal worlds,
and hence the domain of quantiĕcation for a deontic modal, is determined relative
to an information state. But Kolodny and MacFarlane make no claims to integrate
their discussion of information-sensitivity or their resulting analysis into the stan-
dard Kratzerian framework for modals in linguistic semantics. Doing so suggests
alternative ways of capturing the data that they do not consider.
On the face of it, the ĕx to the standard Kratzer semantics might seem simple:
We might treat evidence-sensitive ‘ought’s as quantifying over those possibilities,
among those consistent with a relevant body of evidence, that best approximate the
deontic ideal. However, aer gathering further data regarding the behavior of deon-
tic ‘ought’ when unembedded in root declarative clauses and embedded in condi-
tionals (§), I will show that this suggestion is insuﬃcient (§). ough this strategy
fails, an alternative version of the standard semantics can indeed capture the relevant
data, pace K & MF  and most others in the recent literature
on information-sensitivity (§). A modal’s notional sensitivity to information need
For example: “[Normative] conversational backgrounds can function as ordering sources for
a circumstantial modal base,” where “[c]ircumstantial modality is the modality of rational agents”
(, p. ; cf. , p. –). is terminology will be clariĕed in §.

not be captured by treating it semantically as an “informational modal” in their sense
(to be described).
Nevertheless I will argue that we have good reasons to adopt an information-
sensitive semantics of the general type described in K&MF 
(§§–). Contrary to the standard semantics, deontic rankings can themselves be
information- or evidence-sensitive in the following sense: Relative deontic value
between possibilities sometimes depends on which possibilities are live. Capturing
this point within a (revised) Kratzerian framework raises complications, both tech-
nical and philosophical, that Kolodny and MacFarlane do not address. e main
contributions ofmy theory, developed in §, concern (a) how to capture information-
sensitivity within an ordering semantics for modals and restrictor semantics for
conditionals, (b) how to do so in a way that captures the variety of data and does
not presuppose particular substantive normative views, and (c) how to interpret the
orderings generated in the semantics. (In the Appendix I oﬀer, within the frame-
work of Discourse Representationeory, one way of formalizing the more theory-
neutral semantics developed in §.) By attending to the complexities introduced
by integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard semantic
framework, we can also illuminate the various roles that information and evidence
play in logical arguments, discourse, and deliberation (§).
 Data
Our child has injured himself and is badly in need of medical attention. e phones
are down, and there’s no way to call an ambulance. We quickly get our son into the
car and race to the local hospital. As we get closer, the traﬃc suddenly slows down
on the highway. We near an exit for Route  that would, under normal conditions,
get us to the hospital faster. e problem is that the city has been doing construction
on Route  on alternating days, and we have no way of ĕnding out (without taking
the route) whether they’re doing construction on it today. If they are, we’ll get stuck,
and our sonwill suﬀer serious long-termdamage andmay even die; but if they aren’t,
we’ll be able to speed along to the hospital. If we stay put along our current route,
we’ll make it to the hospital slowly but surely, but likely with some complications
from the delay. As it turns out, unbeknownst to us, they aren’t doing construction
on the ; the way is clear. What should we do?
Compare K &MF  for discussion of the Miners Case from Parĕt (,
), who credits it to Donald Regan (, p. n.); see also J .

When we make judgments about what to do in a position of uncertainty, we
oen ĕnd ourselves hedging our bets in ways that we wouldn’t if we knew all the
facts. (ink: insurance policy purchases.) ere is a salient reading of ()—with
implicit assumptions made explicit in ()—on which it’s true.
() We ought to stay put.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to stay put.
Aer all, we don’t know, and have no way of ĕnding out in advance, whether there
is construction on the , and the results will be disastrous if we switch but the  is
blocked.
However, when we consider the case not from our limited subjective perspective
but from a bird’s-eye point of view, the judgment in ()—with implicit assumptions
made explicit in ()— can seem compelling.
() We ought to switch to the .
() In view of the relevant circumstances, we ought to switch to the .
Aer all, the way is in fact clear and switching to the  will get our child to the
hospital most quickly.
us I take it that () and () each has a reading on which it is true. On the true
reading of (), the ‘ought’ is interpreted as an evidence-sensitive ‘ought’, as “ought
in view of the evidence.” By contrast, on the true reading of (), the ‘ought’ is inter-
preted as a circumstantial ‘ought’, as “ought in view of the relevant circumstances.”
A simple calculation of expected utility would explain the truth of () on its evidence-sensitive
reading—using two states (clear, blocked), two acts (stay put, switch routes), and relevant assign-
ments of probabilities to states and utilities to outcomes. However, I remain neutral here on what
ultimately makes this normative conclusion correct; consequentialist, deontological, and virtue the-
ories may all ratify it. Also, I bracket just whose evidence is relevant and remain neutral between
contextualist and non-contextualist treatments, that is, neutral on whether the relevant evidential
state is always supplied from the context or is sometimes supplied from a context of assessment or a
parameter of the circumstance of evaluation (see, e.g., S , Y ,  F
& G , D , M ; cf. S b).
Readers who deny that the correct deontic view is such that what we ought to do can be sensi-
tive to features of our limited epistemic position may feel free to embed sentences under, e.g., “Given
the truth of X’s beliefs about the correct deontic view.” My distinction between “circumstantial” and
“evidence-sensitive” ‘ought’s closely mirrors the common distinction between “objective” and “sub-
jective” senses of ‘ought’. I use ‘circumstantial’ instead of ‘objective’ because such interpretations
simply need to be sensitive to certain contextually relevant circumstances; the objective ‘ought’ is a
limiting case of this. I avoid calling the evidence-sensitive reading “subjective” for reasons that will

(Of course, since we do not have access to the facts about the traﬃc conditions that
help make () true, we would not be in a position to assert (). But our question is
simply whether () has a reading on which it is true.)
Our ĕrst piece of data is that deontic modals can be interpreted not only with
respect to a relevant body of facts about the world, known and unknown, but also
with respect to a relevant body of evidence. Unembedded deontic ‘ought’ can re-
ceive both circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings. ough deontic ‘ought’
can have these diﬀerent readings, I’m sympathetic with Kratzer’s view that “there is
something in the meaning [of the modal]… which stays invariable” (, p. ).
So I assume that, other things being equal, it would be preferable to derive circum-
stantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ from a common semantic core,
or at least capture as much commonality between them as the data allows.
I should say that the distinction between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive
readings is perhaps not a deep conceptual distinction. One of the relevant circum-
stances, one might say, is that we do not know whether there is construction on
the ; in that sense, ‘In view of the relevant circumstances, we ought to stay put’ is
true. True enough. But it is not counterintuitive that the sorts of facts that are tar-
geted in phrases like ‘in view of the circumstances’ and in the relevant reading of ()
are facts about the external circumstances, or conditions in the world over which
the relevant agent(s) currently has (have) no direct control. In (), for example, ‘the
relevant circumstances’ can be understood as short for “the relevant facts or circum-
stances concerning the traﬃc conditions, our current location, our child’s physical
condition, our driving skills, etc.” In view of these facts, it makes sense to say that
() is true. It is in this way that our talk about “circumstantial ‘ought’s” and what we
ought to do in view of “the relevant facts or circumstances” should be understood
(cf. A ).
Second, though we can get alternative readings of unembedded deontic ‘ought’s,
as brought out in the availability of both () and (), there are interesting constraints
on what readings are available in conditionals. e reading of ‘ought’ in ‘we ought
to stay put’ is simply unavailable in a true reading of the straight ‘if p, (then) q’ hy-
pothetical conditional:
become clear below. I use ‘circumstantial’ and ‘evidence-sensitive’ to map onto circumstantial and
epistemic modal bases, respectively (see §).
See also W ; L ; A ; B ; G ; P-
 ; P  (though cf. C , Q  . , P ). For
discussions of proliferating senses of ‘ought’ in the ethics literature, see, e.g., J , F
,  R .
I use the term ‘hypothetical conditional’ in the sense of I .

() If the way is clear, we ought to stay put.
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
In a manner to be explained, the ‘ought’ in the consequent of () seems to be inter-
preted as if the information that the way is clear is already available, this despite the
fact that the antecedent of () is not as in ().
() a. If the way is clear and we know it, we ought to switch to the .
b. If we learn that the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
If there is a true reading at all of a deontic conditional like () with () as its conse-
quent clause, this reading is only available with a construction like ‘even if ’ or ‘still’:
() Even if the way is clear, we still ought to stay put.
 e standard semantics
Our task is to examinewhether the standard semantics can accommodate these phe-
nomena. Let’s clarify what this “standard semantics” is. Standardly, modals are in-
terpreted as quantiĕers over possible worlds. Simplifying a bit, the domain of quan-
tiĕcation is set by two contextually supplied parameters: a set f of accessible worlds
(a “modal base”), and a preorder ≲ (a reĘexive and transitive relation) onW, where
this preorder ranks worlds along some relevant dimension. e modal quantiĕes
One might say that we take () to be true because we reinterpret it as enthymematic for (),
implicitly assuming that we can learn whether the way is clear (see  F ). But I take this
suggestion to be something of a non-starter (see C  for further discussion). First, at least in
cases with deontic ‘must’, there seems to be a contrast in acceptability between conditionals with ‘if
 ’ and ‘if we learn that  ’ as their antecedents:
(i) ?If the way is clear, we must switch to the .
(ii) If we learn that the way is clear, we must switch to the .
Judgments are subtle here. But informal polling suggests that, in the context as described, whereas
(i) is dispreferred—we do not have an obligation to switch to the  conditional on how the world
happens to be— (ii) is true. is suggests that the antecedent in (i) is not reinterpreted as in (ii). It
would be odd if the antecedents of deontic ‘ought’ conditionals were reinterpreted in the proposed
way but the antecedents of deontic ‘must’ conditionals were not. Second, the reinterpretationmove is
ad hoc. ere is no independent mechanism I know of to motivate why this type of reinterpretation
should occur in these examples. In any event, it will be instructive to examine the prospects for
developing a semantics that captures how (), as it stands, is true.
In addition toK , , , see L , ,  F , V
.

over those worlds in the modal base that rank highest in the preorder. Diﬀerent
readings of modals arise from diﬀerent contextual resolutions of the modal base
and preorder.
Modal bases determine reĘexive accessibility relations: they are sets of worlds
consistent with a body of truths in the world of evaluation. For Kratzer, the two
main types of modal bases are circumstantial (a set of worlds consistent with certain
relevant circumstances), on the one hand, and evidence-based or epistemic (a set of
worlds consistent with a certain relevant body of evidence), on the other. (I’ll use
‘epistemic’ broadly to cover modal bases describing relevant bodies of knowledge
or evidence.) Hereaer I assume that our preorders are deontic and are indexed
to a world of evaluation—written ‘≲w’ (read: “is at least as deontically good as at
w”)— since, as we saw in (), deontic modals can themselves occur in intensional
contexts that shi the ordering.
A deontic selection functionD can be deĕned to select from some domain those
worlds that are not ≲w bettered by any other world:
Deĕnition . ∀Z ⊆W∶D(Z;≲w) ∶= {w′ ∈ Z∶ ∀w′′ ∈ Z∶w′′ ≲w w′⇒ w′ ≲w w′′}
D selects the set of≲w-maximal (“≲w-best”)worlds from themodal base, thoseworlds
in the modal base that best approximate the deontic ideal. Modals quantify over
these worlds in D(f(w);≲w). As deontic modals, on Kratzer’s view, take circum-
stantial modal bases, the truth-conditions for ‘Ought ’ are roughly as follows. (‘J K’
denotes the interpretation function, a function from contexts c, indices w, and well-
formed expressions to extensions.)
Deĕnition . JOught Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(fcirc(w);≲w)∶ JKc;w′ = 
is says that ‘Ought ’ is true iﬀ ‘’ is true at all the best circumstantially accessible
worlds.
I assume a Kratzerian restrictor analysis of conditionals on which ‘if ’-clauses re-
strict the modal bases of various operators like modals. To interpret a conditional,
I make the following simplifying assumptions: I treat modal bases as mapping worlds to sets
of worlds, rather than to sets of propositions (and use ‘modal base’ to refer sometimes to this func-
tion, sometimes to its value given a world of evaluation); I abstract away from details introduced by
Kratzer’s ordering source; I make the Limit Assumption (L , pp. –) and assume that
our selection function is well-deĕned and non-empty; and I bracket diﬀerences in quantiĕcational
strength between weak and strong necessity modals. For semantics without the Limit Assumption,
see L , , K , , S . On the distinction between weak and
strong necessity modals, I prefer the account in S , a.
See K , pp. –, , pp. –. Cf. L , pp. –.

on this view, evaluate the proposition expressed by the consequent clause relative to
(a) the preorder at the world of evaluation, and (b) the modal base at the world of
evaluation restricted to worlds in which the antecedent is true:
Deĕnition . JIf  ; ought Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(f+(w);≲w)∶ JKc;w′ = ,
where f+(w) = f(w) ∩ J Kc. (Remark: JKc ∶= {w ∶ JKc;w = } )
is says that ‘If  , ought ’ is true iﬀ ‘’ is true in all the accessible  -worlds that
are best in view of the deontic ideal at the world of evaluation.
Call this package ‘the standard Kratzer semantics’, or simply ‘the standard se-
mantics’. ere is a feature of this view that I want to highlight. On the standard
semantics, the preorders with respect to which modals are interpreted are indepen-
dently deĕned in the following sense. ey are preorders on W. e only role of
the modal base is to restrict our attention to diﬀerent subsets of the given preorder.
Specifying a modal base just knocks worlds out of the ranking; it doesn’t change
how the remaining worlds are ranked. ough ‘ought’ in Deĕnition  is treated
as quantifying over the worlds in D(f(w);≲w), this notation is a bit sloppy. More
precisely, the standard semantics says that given a preordered set (W;≲w) and non-
empty subset f(w) ofW, ‘ought’ quantiĕes over the worlds in D (f(w);≲w∩ f(w)).
Deĕnition . For a set S, its binary Cartesian product S = S×S = {⟨x; y⟩∶ x ∈ S ∧ y ∈ S}.
Since ≲w ∩ f(w) is just a sub-preorder of ≲w, the relations between worlds as given
by the preorder ≲w onWwill bemaintained whenwe only consider the worlds in the
givenmodal base. Informally, howworlds are ranked relative to one another is inde-
pendent of which other worlds are relevant. is feature of the standard semantics
will be important in what follows.
 A failed ĕrst pass
is ordering semantics framework suggests two general ways of attempting to cap-
ture the diﬀerence between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of deon-
tic ‘ought’: posit a shi in modal base, or posit a shi in preorder. Let’s start with the
former option: there is a shi in modal base but a constant preorder in the interpre-
tations of circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’. We will return
to the latter option in § aer we are in a position to compare it to our alternative
proposal developed in §.
One might think that what changes in the interpretation of circumstantial and
evidence-sensitive ‘ought’s is the set of possibilities being considered, or the modal

base. is is suggested by our paraphrases of () and () in () and (), respectively,
reproduced below.
() We ought to stay put.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to stay put.
() We ought to switch to the .
() In view of the circumstances, we ought to switch to the .
As noted above, for Kratzer the two main types of modal bases are circumstantial
and epistemic; it is the role of adverbial phrases like “in view of the relevant cir-
cumstances” and “in view of the evidence” to supply these respective modal bases
for the interpretation of the modal. So one might think that () is true on its “epis-
temic” reading, where the modal base consists of a set of worlds consistent with the
evidence (which, importantly, leaves open whether there is construction on the );
whereas () and ()
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
are true on their “circumstantial” readings, where the modal base is a set of worlds
consistent with the relevant circumstances (which, importantly, establish that the 
is clear). In this way, one might think that a circumstantial modal base determines
the circumstantial ‘ought’ and an epistemic modal base determines the evidence-
sensitive ‘ought’ (again, where a constant deontic preorder is used in interpreting
both readings). Call this hypothesis ‘  ’.
Assuming a Kratzerian restrictor analysis of conditionals as given in Deĕni-
tion , the predicted truth-conditions of (), according to   , will
be as in ().
() J()Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(f+circ(w);≲w): we switch to the  in w′, where
f+circ(w) = fcirc(w) ∩ {w′′∶ the way is clear in w′′}
is says () is true iﬀ we switch to the  in all the circumstantially accessible worlds
in which the way is clear that are best in view of the deontic ideal at the world of
evaluation.
ere is something importantly right about   . However, it is
insuﬃcient as it stands. First, we do not yet have an explanation for how () could
be true, even on its evidence-sensitive reading, given that () is true on its circum-
stantial reading. Consider two worlds w′ and w′′ such that w′ ∈ D(fcirc(w);≲w) and
w′′ ∈ D(fepist(w);≲w)—where fepist(w) is the set of worlds consistent with the avail-

able evidence about the road conditions, our child’s health, the location of the hos-
pital, and so on. ough in w′ we switch to the  and in w′′ we stay put, w′ and w′′
are otherwise identical; the way is clear in both w′ and w′′. Challenge: How could
w′ be a ≲w-best world in fcirc(w) but not in fepist(w)? How could it be that all the≲w-best worlds in fepist(w) aren’t all worlds where we switch to the , given that in
some worlds in fepist(w) the way is clear? We need an explanation for how and in
what sense staying put could be best.
More precisely, consider the following worlds, CS, BS, CP, and BP, characterized
with respect to the relevant state of the world (whether the way is Clear or Blocked)
and action taken (whether we Switch or stay Put), and which are consistent with the
other details of the case. (esemight be treated as representatives of suitable equiv-
alence classes of worlds.) Given our description of the case, the epistemic modal
base is a subset of the circumstantial modal base. Roughly, the two are identical ex-
cept for the fact that all worlds consistent with the relevant circumstances are worlds
where the way is clear, whereas someworlds consistent with our evidence are worlds
where the way is blocked: fcirc(w) = {CS;CP} and fepist(w) = {CS;BS;CP;BP}.
(Since the way is actually clear, the evaluation world w may be either CS or CP.)
Given that on their circumstantial readings () is true and () is false, we see that
CS ∈ D(fcirc(w);≲w) and that CS <w CP. e worry for    is that
given that CS remains in the epistemic modal base fepist(w), and given that the less
long-term damage for our child the better, CS remains deontically best when BS and
BP are added to the modal base.
Second, conversely,    does not account for how () could be
true on its circumstantial reading given that () is true on its evidence-sensitive read-
ing. Intuitively, since the circumstantial modal base is a subset of the epistemic
modal base, if a world in the epistemic modal base is best by ≲w, it will remain best
when the domain is restricted to the circumstantial modal base. More formally:
Since ≲w is just a set of ordered pairs, we can intersect it with another set of ordered
pairs to yield an order preserving sub-preorder.
Deĕnition . Let S = (S;≲S) and T = (T;≲T) be preordered sets. S ⊴ T (read: ‘S is a
sub-preorder of T’) if S ⊆ T and ≲S=≲T ∩ S.
Proposition . Let S = (S;≲S) and T = (T;≲T) be preordered sets such that S ⊴ T.∀u; v ∈ S∶u ≲T v⇔ u ≲S v.
eorem . Let S = (S;≲S) and T = (T;≲T) be preordered sets such that S ⊴ T.∀u ∈ S∶u ∈ D(T;≲T)⇒ u ∈ D(S;≲S).

Proof. Consider an element u∗ of S. Suppose for reductio (i) that u∗ ∈ D(T;≲T), and
(ii) that u∗ ∉ D(S;≲S). By (i) and Deĕnition , ∀u′ ∈ T∶u′ ≲T u∗ ⇒ u∗ ≲T u′. But by
(ii) and Deĕnition  it follows that there is a world v ∈ S such that v ≲S u∗ ∧ u∗ ≴S v.
Since S ⊆ T; v ∈ T. So v ≲T u∗ ∧ u∗ ≴T v, since by Proposition  ≲S is an order
preserving sub-preorder of ≲T. Contradiction. So, ∀u ∈ S∶u ∈ D(T;≲T) ⇒ u ∈
D(S;≲S).
e problem is that if w′ is in D(fepist(w);≲w), then, since w′ ∈ fcirc(w) and fcirc(w) ⊂
fepist(w), w′ is also in D(fcirc(w);≲w). By eorem , the deontically best worlds in
fepist(w), given that they are also consistent with the relevant circumstances, remain
deontically best with respect to a contraction of the domain to fcirc(w). So 
  incorrectly predicts that if () is true, () is false, evenwhen the former is
given an evidence-sensitive reading and the latter is given a circumstantial reading.
Now turn to the indicative conditional in (). e third problem for 
 is that in order to accommodate the felicity of (),    would
have to say that the relevant circumstances do not specify whether or not the way is
clear (assuming, as is plausible, that ‘if p : : : ’ presupposes that p is not settled). But
the relevant circumstances do specify this; this is part of what makes () true. So the
choice of modal base in () seems ad hoc. Treating the modal base as circumstantial
also obscures such conditionals’ continuity with unembedded evidence-sensitive
‘oughts’. Example () seems as closely related to () as expected utility is to condi-
tional expected utility. (We will return to this point in §.)
Fourth, modifying    by treating the modal base in the condi-
tional as epistemic still leaves problems. is is because, for Kratzer, the antecedent
of a deontic conditional ‘If  , ought ’ restricts the preorder used to evaluate ‘ought
’ to preorder only the  -worlds. Paralleling our second argument above, we can
intersect ≲w with another set of ordered pairs— the binary Cartesian product ofJ K—to yield an order preserving sub-preorder used in evaluating ‘ought ’. In-
tersecting ≲w with J K yields a preorder over only  -worlds preordered by ≲w that
maintains the relations between them speciĕed by≲w. So, as long as theway is clear
in some world w′ ∈ D(fepist(w);≲w)—or at least as long as ‘In view of our evidence,
our staying put is better than our switching’ is true relative to ≲w—if the ≲w-best
worlds out of some domain are worlds where we stay put, then the best worlds with
respect to the sub-preorder ≲w ∩ Jthe way is clearK will still be worlds where we stay
put. M   incorrectly predicts that () is false given that () is true.
We still need an explanation for how () and () are both true and felicitous.
anks to Eric Swanson for this way of putting the point.

Onemight try to salvage    by advancing a covert highermodal
analysis of deontic conditionals like (). On such an analysis, the ‘if ’-clause in an
overtly modalized conditional like () restricts the modal base of a posited higher
covert modal, rather than that of the overt modal. In eﬀect, the conditional claims
that the modal sentence ‘we ought to switch to the ’ is true in all the worlds w′ ac-
cessible fromwwhere the way is clear. Assuming the covert modal is epistemic (as is
customary), we get roughly the following truth-conditions for (), where f+epist(w) =
fepist(w) ∩ {w′′′∶ the way is clear in w′′′}.
() J()Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∀w′′ ∈ D(fcirc(w′);≲w′): we switch to the  in
w′′
A covert modal analysis might be thought to help respond to our fourth objection,
that of explaining how () and () are both true, for the following reason. When
evaluating the consequent clause we see what is deontically best in view of the pre-
order at the worldsw′ in which the way is clear. So, as long as the deontic preorder at
some world w′ accessible from the world of evaluation ranks some world w′′ (acces-
sible from w′) where we switch to the  as best— and assuming suitable constraints
on the modal base of the overt modal— () will be true even if () is true.
is responsewon’t itself do the trick, evenputting aside the fact that it won’t help
   respond to our ĕrst three objections above. First, the reply turns
on the assumption that the deontic preorder at the (epistemically) accessible worlds
is relevantly diﬀerent from the deontic preorder atw. Butwe can stipulate as a feature
of the case that we have no relevant normative uncertainty. e deontic preorder
then won’t vary across epistemically accessible worlds. is is a problem because,
if the deontic preorder is kept constant,    won’t be able to show
how () is consistent with (). Since modal bases determine reĘexive accessibility
relations, the world of evaluationw is always one of the worldsw′ in the modal base.
But, as we saw in the second objection above,    cannot capture how
‘we ought to switch to the ’ is true at w (= w′), even on its circumstantial reading;
and so, it still cannot capture how () is true, given that () is true.
Here is another way of making the same point. Given that ‘we ought to stay put’
is true in the world of evaluation w, the accessible worlds that are ≲w-best are worlds
where we stay put. Now suppose that in w, the way is clear and we stay put, and
that w is much like the actual world (e.g., in its laws) but is otherwise deontically
perfect. So one of the ≲w-best worlds where the way is clear is a world where we stay
For defenses of covert modal analyses of various conditional constructions, see F ,
G ,  F & I , L , S , and S .

put. Again, since modal bases determine reĘexive accessibility relations, w is one
of the worlds w′ that is accessible from w. So one of the ≲w′-best worlds accessible
from the accessible worlds where the way is clear is a world where we stay put (again,
assuming that all circumstantially accessible worlds are also epistemically accessi-
ble). But the conditional says that all the best worlds accessible from the accessible
worlds where the way is clear are worlds where we switch to the . Contradiction.
Intuitively, () and () are both true in the speciĕed model. But, even with a covert
modal analysis,    incorrectly predicts that they are inconsistent.
ere may be various ways to modify    to ward oﬀ some of
these concerns. However, the arguments of this section suggest the following gen-
eral lesson. It cannot simply be a shi in modal base that explains the observed
variation in readings. A semantics that treats modal bases merely as restrictors of
an independently deĕned deontic preorder will not be able to accommodate the
data described in §. In the next section I will outline a semantics that elucidates
our data. is will obviate the motivation to add further epicycles to  
. (We will return to the “shi in preorder” strategy in §.)
 A solution: Information-reĘecting deontic preorders
As I see it, the problem with    is not its claim that the ‘in view
of ’ phrases in glosses like “ought in view of our evidence” and “ought in view of
the circumstances” play their usual role of specifying a modal base. e problem
is that the devil’s in the preorder. I suggest that, contrary to the standard semantics,
evaluations of deontic betterness among worlds in a domain can depend essentially
on global properties of that domain. Deontic requirements need not simply order
worlds in the modal base; they can also be sensitive to the fact that the modal base
is as it is. We need the accessible worlds to be able to “see” what the other accessible
worlds are like. is suggests the following glosses for (), (), and ().
More formally: Suppose () is true in the world of evaluationw, and the way happens to be clear
in w. en ∀w′ ∈ D(fepist(w);≲w)∶ we stay put in w′. Suppose the world of evaluation w is one such
world w′ ∈ D(fepist(w);≲w); accordingly, we stay put in w. As noted above, fcirc(w′) ⊂ fepist(w); and
suppose that ∀w′′′ ∈ fepist(w)∶ ∀u; v ∈ fcirc(w′′′)∶u ≲w′′′ v⇔ v ≲w′′′ u. (Weaker assumptions would
suﬃce for our purposes, but these make the problem more transparent.) en w ∈ D(fcirc(w′);≲w′).
So, since the way is clear in w, ∃w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∃w′′ ∈ D(fcirc(w′);≲w′)∶ we stay put (and thus don’t
switch to the ) in w′′—namely, where w = w′ = w′′. But () says that ∀w′ ∈ f+epist(w)∶ ∀w′′ ∈
D(fcirc(w′);≲w′)∶ we switch to the  in w′′. Contradiction.

() a. Given that the epistemic modal base is as it is— i.e., given that it con-
tains both worlds where the way is clear and worlds where the way is
not clear— the best of these are worlds where we stay put.
b. Given that the circumstantial modal base is as it is— i.e., given that
it contains only worlds where the way is clear— the best of these are
worlds where we switch to the .
c. If the way is clear, then, given that the updated modal base is as it
is— i.e., given that it contains onlyworlds where theway is clear— the
best of these are worlds where we switch to the .
ere are a number of ways we might implement this informal thought. We
might avail ourselves of the resources of decision theory and build probability func-
tions and utility functions into the semantics, perhaps deriving deontic preorders
from calculations of expected utility. For the sake of generality I will put this strat-
egy aside. Abstracting away from details about how deontic preorders are gener-
ated, what we need in our revised Kratzer semantics is for the generation of deontic
preorders to be information-sensitive in the following sense: It needs to be sensitive
to what the set being preordered is like. A world’s position in the deontic preorder
cannot always be determined independently of which worlds are in the set being
preordered. Deontic preorders can thus reĘect a world’s relative approximation of
a deontic ideal, where what this ideal is can vary given diﬀerent information states.
In decision-theoretic terms, the preorder on worlds can be treated as reĘecting, not
the absolute utilities of the possible outcomes—e.g., no delay, short delay, long de-
lay—but the expected utilities of the various acts one performs or strategies one
takes in those worlds.
We can capture this by indexing the deontic preorder used in interpreting weak
necessity modals like ‘ought’ to a world of evaluation and an information state (a
set of worlds) s—written ‘≲w;s’. (Which information state? e information state
characterizing themodal’s local context, or the original context as possiblymodiĕed
by a clause or part of a clause. More on this shortly.) is suggests the following
See L  for developments (though cf. K ).
is amounts to a denial of the assumption articulated in S & T , p. 
and S , p.  for the case of the similarity relation used in interpreting counterfactu-
als. Cf. Kolodny andMacFarlane’s treatment of deontic selection functions as “seriously information-
dependent” (, p. ).
us Charlow’s () worry that the semantics in K &MF  violates an
analog of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives does not carry over to the semantics presented
here (pp. , –; cf. L , p. ).

revised truth-conditions:
Deĕnition . JOught Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(f(w); [s: ≲w;s] (f(w)))∶ JKc;w′ = 
As we will see, s need not represent the information state of anyone in particular. I
use the term ‘information state’ in a broad sense simply to describe a set of worlds.
Both epistemic and circumstantial modal bases—updated or not— represent in-
formation states in this sense. (ough more ĕne-grained characterizations of in-
formation statesmay be needed to deliver the appropriate verdicts formore complex
cases— e.g., certain cases involving probabilistic information or evidence—given
our purposes I bracket such complications here.)
e contrast with Kratzer is important. As noted in §, on the standard seman-
tics modals are interpreted with respect to an independently deĕned preorder; the
modal base simply restricts our attention to diﬀerent subsets of it. More formally,
context supplies a deontic preorder on W that is a function solely of the world of
evaluation w. Fixing w ĕxes the preorder. e only role of the modal base f(w) is
to generate a sub-preorder ≲w ∩ f(w), the maximal elements of which supply the
modal’s domain of quantiĕcation. Consequently, if one world is ranked better than
another according to the preorder, it will remain better with respect to any subset
that contains both worlds as members (see eorem ). By contrast, on my revised
picture what context supplies is a function from amodal base (and a world of evalu-
ation) to a preorder on that modal base. In this way, the modal base does not simply
restrict an independently deĕned preorder; it helps determine what the preorder is.
As a result, two worlds can be ranked diﬀerently relative to one another whenmem-
bers of diﬀerent modal bases. ese contrasts are reĘected in Figure .
Deĕnition . < (read: “is deontically better than”) is a strict partial order such that∀w′;w′′∶w′ < w′′⇔ w′ ≲ w′′ ∧ w′′ ≴ w′.
K :
W = {w;w;w;w}: <w = {⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩;⟨w;w⟩}
In the terminology from K &MF , this semantics treats deontic ‘ought’
as an “informational modal” (p. ). See the Appendix for a concrete way of formalizing the largely
theory-neutral analysis presented here within Discourse Representationeory. For alternative, in-
dependently developed accounts, see B & F , C  . , C
, and L , in addition to the seminal discussion in K & MF ;
though I think there are good reasons for preferring an analysis along the lines presented here, for
reasons of space I must reserve discussion for future work.

Figure : Kratzerian vs. information-reĘecting orders
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f(w) ⊂W = {w;w;w}: <w ∩ f(w) = {⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩}
f(w) ⊂W = {w;w;w}: <w ∩ f(w) = {⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩}
- :
f(w) = {w;w;w}: [s : <w;s] (f(w)) =<w;f(w)= {⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩; ⟨w;w⟩}
f(w) = {w;w}: [s : <w;s] (f(w)) = <w;f(w)= {⟨w;w⟩}
A word on terminology. Call a function [s : ≲w;s] from information states to
preorders a preorder selector. A preorder selector is information-sensitive, inmy sense,
iﬀ it is a non-constant function from information states to preorders, that is, a func-
tion that sometimes yields diﬀerent preorders when given diﬀerent information
states as arguments. By extension I will say that a preorder is information-reĘecting
iﬀ it is the value of an information-sensitive preorder selector.
Before turning to our data, it is worth mentioning that our indexing preorders
to an information state does not itself imply that modals with information-sensitive
andnon-information-sensitive interpretations have distinct lexical entries. As noted
in §§–, one perceived advantage of Kratzer’s framework is that by treating modals
as context-dependent quantiĕers it captures the various Ęavors of modality in a uni-
ĕed way without positing an ambiguity. e analysis here does not force us to forfeit
this advantage. (ough of course one might accept that modals are ambiguous on
other grounds.) All modals can be interpreted with respect to preorders that are in-
dexed to an information state, even if some preorders are not sensitive to the value of
this parameter— that is, even if some are non-information-reĘecting. Information-
sensitive ‘ought’ need not have a distinct lexical entry.
In the remainder of this section I will explain in a more or less theory-neutral
way how information-sensitive deontic preorder selectors can help account for the
data from §. Revising Kratzer’s account in light of received philosophical consider-

ations about how evidence can bear on what we ought to do generates an improved
semantics that nicely predicts our data.
I noted above that deontic preorders used in interpreting ‘ought’ are to be in-
dexed to the information state determined by the modal’s local context. In an un-
embedded sentence ‘Ought ’, the local context is equivalent to the global context;
thus, ≲ is indexed to w and f(w).
Start with (), our evidence-sensitive deontic ‘ought’ in a root declarative clause.
Here s = fepist(w), the set of worlds consistent with the available evidence. We predict
the following truth-conditions.
() We ought to stay put.
() J()Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(s;≲w;s): we stay put in w′, where s = fepist(w)
Since the deontic preorder is indexed to the set of epistemically accessible worlds
fepist(w), we correctly predict that () is true. Since some worlds in fepist(w) are
worlds where the way is clear and some are worlds where the way is blocked, the≲w;fepist(w)-best of these worlds will be worlds where we stay put. (Here and through-
out I assume we are restricting our attention to information-sensitive preorder se-
lectors that reĘect plausible views on how deontic value depends on information.)
We can thus explain our ĕrst piece of data: the true reading of (), where ‘ought’
is interpreted as “ought in view of the evidence.” As is evident, it isn’t simply the
fact that the modal base is epistemic that explains how this reading is generated.
e deontic preorder also reĘects what this modal base is like— speciĕcally, that it
includes some worlds where the way is clear and some worlds where it isn’t.
Now turn to the true reading of (). ReĘecting that the ‘ought’ is interpreted as
a circumstantial ‘ought’, “ought in view of the relevant circumstances,” the relevant
information state s∗ will be set to fcirc(w):
() We ought to switch to the .
() J()Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(s∗;≲w;s∗): we switch to the  in w′, where s∗ =
fcirc(w)
Examples involving claims about what some other agent ought to do in view of her evidence or
claims about one ought to do in view of some other contextually salient body of information—where
the agent’s evidence or the salient information diﬀer from the evidence available in the conversational
context—pose no special problems and may be treated analogously. In such cases the modal base
and the information state to which the preorder is indexed is, intuitively, the one characterizing the
agent’s epistemic state or the contextually salient body of information (though see n. ).

Insofar as the information-reĘecting deontic preorder is indexed to the circum-
stantial modal base s∗—which, importantly, includes only worlds where the way
is clear— the ≲w;fcirc(w)-best of these worlds will be worlds in which we switch to the
. is is the correct result.
But if the preorders used in interpreting () and () are relevantly diﬀerent in
these ways— insofar as they rank certain pairs of worlds diﬀerently—do circum-
stantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ really count as being derived from
a common semantic core (see §)? Yes. On the standard Kratzer semantics, what
context supplies for the interpretation of a modal isn’t, strictly speaking, a set of ac-
cessible worlds and a preorder; rather, what is supplied is a function from a world of
evaluation to a set of accessible worlds and a preorder. As a result, though the rele-
vant circumstances, for example, may vary fromworld to world, what is contributed
for interpretation by a phrase like ‘in view of the relevant circumstances’ remains
constant; it is a function from a world w to the set of worlds consistent with the
relevant circumstances in w. We reĘected this in the formalism by treating modal
bases f as taking worlds as argument and indexing deontic preorders to worlds. e
situation is precisely parallel in our revised picture. ough the deontic preorder
can vary from information state to information state (and perhaps from world to
world), what is contributed to the interpretation of ‘ought’ that makes it count as
“deontic” remains constant; it is a function from a world and an information state
to a preorder, as reĘected in the formalism by double indexing the preorder to these
two parameters. As captured in the truth-conditions in Deĕnition , this is so re-
gardless of whether the modal is given an evidence-sensitive or circumstantial read-
ing. It is in this sense that our analysis derives circumstantial and evidence-sensitive
readings of deontic ‘ought’ in a uniĕed way from a common semantic core.
Complicating matters a bit, let’s return to the deontic conditional in ().
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
e appropriate reading for () is predicted from independent principles of local
interpretation. Following K , S , and H ,
among many others, I assume that the consequent of a conditional must be inter-
preted with respect to the local context set up by the antecedent— i.e., with respect
to the global context (hypothetically) incremented with the antecedent. Accord-
I am blurring the distinction between global contexts and the (epistemic) modal bases they
determine. Given the sort of context-dependence we are interested in, no harm will come from
this. For expository purposes I assume that the incrementing proceeds via set-intersection. e
point about local interpretation might be put in terms of context change potentials; however, it is

ingly, in a deontic hypothetical conditional ‘If  , ought ’, the preorder will be in-
dexed to w and f(w) ∩ J Kc. In () the ‘ought’ in the consequent is interpreted with
respect to the global context incremented with the proposition that the way is clear,
as reĘected in (). e truth-conditions for () are given in ().
() [If the way is clear]c [we ought to switch to the ]c=c∩ p
() J()Kc;w =  iﬀ ∀w′ ∈ D(s+;≲w;s+): we switch to the  in w′, where s+ =
fepist(w) ∩ {w′′∶ the way is clear in w′′}
e global context is, roughly, the set of worlds consistent with the evidence (see
§). e ‘if ’-clause restricts this set to contain only worlds where the way is clear.
As themodal in the consequent clause is interpreted relative to this updated context,
the deontic preorder is indexed to this restricted set of worlds that encodes the in-
formation that the way is clear. Given that f+epist(w) contains only worlds where the
way is clear, the deontically best of these, relative to this updated information state,
are worlds in which we switch to the . In this way, in conditionals like () we, in
eﬀect, update our epistemic state with the information expressed in the antecedent
and then determine what ought to be in light of that updated information state.
 Shis in preorder?
In § we noted that the standard Kratzer semantics suggests two broad ways of cap-
turing the diﬀerence between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of de-
ontic ‘ought’—namely, in terms of a diﬀerence in modal base, on the one hand, and
preorder, on the other. In § I argued that positing that this diﬀerence is merely due
to a shi inmodal base faces serious problems. We are now in a position to assess the
other type of analysis that avoids making the sorts of revisions to Kratzer’s ordering
semantics developed in §.
us far I have bracketed details regarding how the preorders used in interpret-
ing modals are generated. In Kratzer’s theory preorders are generated by an “order-
ing source” g, or set of propositions (indexed to the world of evaluation): for any
worlds w′ and w′′, w′ is at least as good as w′′ relative to the ideal set up by g(w) iﬀ
all propositions in g(w) that are true in w′′ are also true in w′.
ultimately neutral between static implementations (à la Stalnaker) and dynamic implementations (à
la Heim), yielding truth-conditions and context change potentials, respectively, as semantic values.
ere are several ways of integrating ordering sources into our semantics from §. One option
would be to treat g as a function from worlds and information states to sets of propositions; g would

Deĕnition . w′ ≲g(w) w′′ ∶= ∀p ∈ g(w)∶w′′ ∈ p⇒ w′ ∈ p
In broad outline, a second strategy— call it ‘ ’— aims to explain
the diﬀerence between circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’ in
terms of a diﬀerence in ordering source. It analyzes (a) evidence-sensitive readings
of ‘ought’ in terms of an ordering source that encodes the values of various outcomes
conditional on (perhaps among other things) some relevant epistemic state being
such-and-such way, (b) circumstantial readings of ‘ought’ in terms of an ordering
source that encodes the objective values of various outcomes, and (c) hypothetical
deontic conditionals in terms of the latter (objective) kind of ordering source.
e ordering source implicated in the interpretation of an evidence-sensitive
‘ought’ sentence like (), or at least a simpliĕed version of such an ordering source,
might be something like the following.
() gsubj(w) ={ the way is clear and we know it ⊃ we switch to the ,
the way is blocked and we know it ⊃ we stay put,
we don’t know whether there is construction on the  ⊃ we stay put }
With suitable constraints on the relevant modal base— e.g., assuming it’s restricted
to worlds where we don’t know whether there is construction on the — (), on its
evidence-sensitive reading, will come out true with respect to this ordering source.
e ≲gsubj(w)-best worlds among those where we don’t know whether the way is clear
or blocked are all worlds where we stay put. ese worldsmake true all three propo-
sitions in the ordering source (vacuously in the case of the ĕrst two), whereas worlds
in which we don’t stay put fail to make true the third proposition above. In this way,
the strategy is to build information-sensitivity into the ordering source by includ-
ing propositions expressed by sentences that describe relevant features of the agent’s
epistemic state (and the state of the world) in the antecedents, and describe the ac-
tions available to the agent in the consequents. (For the sake of argument I bracket
worries about whether an ordering source like the one in () will generalize tomore
complex cases, e.g., where the relevant epistemic states must be given a more ĕne-
grained characterization. For I will argue that even if it can, we still have reasons to
prefer an information-sensitive analysis of the sort developed in §.)
By contrast, the ordering source implicated in the interpretation of a circum-
stantial ‘ought’ sentence like () might be something like this:
be type ⟨s; ⟨st; ⟨st; t⟩⟩⟩. An ordering on worlds could be generated as follows:
(i) w′ ≲g(w)(s) w′′ ∶= ∀p ∈ g(w)(s)∶w′′ ∈ p⇒ w′ ∈ p

() gobj(w) ={ the way is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,
the way is blocked ⊃ we stay put }
With suitable constraints on the relevant modal base— e.g., assuming it’s restricted
to worlds where the way is clear— (), on its circumstantial reading, will come out
true: the ≲gobj(w)-best worlds where the way is clear are all worlds where we switch
to the .
Similarly, if we assume a covert modal analysis for overtly modalized deontic
hypothetical conditionals (as described at the end of §), wewill be able to derive the
truth of (). As suggested in the truth-conditions in (), ĕrst we restrict ourselves
to worlds w′ in which the way is clear. Assuming that the deontic ideal in these
worlds is the same as that in the world of evaluation— i.e., assuming that gobj(w) =
gobj(w′)—the ≲gobj(w′)-best of the (circumstantially) accessible worlds w′′ from w′
will all be worlds where we switch to the  (assuming that all such worldsw′′ are still
worlds where the way is clear). So, () is correctly predicted to be true.
In these ways, this implementation of the standard Kratzer semantics may be
able to make the correct predictions about our example sentences (though see be-
low). ‘Ought’s notional sensitivity to information may be captured in the semantics
by encoding relevant features of the agent’s decision problem— the possible states
of the world, the agent’s epistemic state, and the available actions— into proposi-
tions in the ordering source, rather than by giving ‘ought’ an information-sensitive
semantics of the sort described in §. is is an important point to acknowledge
since much of the recent literature has assumed that the standard Kratzer seman-
tics is necessarily inconsistent with the data. e data may not force us to treat
‘ought’ as an “informational modal,” to use Kolodny and MacFarlane’s terminology
(, p. ), or as having its domain of quantiĕcation determined relative to an
information state supplied from the point of evaluation.
is leaves us with two theories, both of which are adequate to our original data.
As is oen the case, how we decide between them may depend largely on theoret-
ical considerations. ough how such considerations tally up can be a subtle mat-
For example: “on any setting for themodal base and ordering source standardly considered, the
framework fails to predict the [evidence-sensitive] reading on which [()] is true”; “the… ordering
source runs into a technical problem when it comes to the interaction with conditional antecedents”
(C  . , pp. , ; though see pp. –). “Standard quantiĕcational semantics for
deonticmodals…are not able to capture these facts [about information-sensitivity]” (L ,
p. ). Cf. K &MF , p.  and C , p. . See also D 
and  F  for discussion.

ter, I would like to present a preliminary case that the alternative theory developed
in §—call it ‘- ’— is the better package deal.
ere are reasons for preferring a theory on which circumstantial and evidence-
sensitive readings of ‘ought’ result from how circumstantial and epistemic modal
bases, respectively, interact with the same information-sensitive preorder selector.
In short, -  seems to oﬀer amore uniĕed analysis
of all the relevant readings of deontic modals.
First, -  treats phrases like ‘in view of the evi-
dence’ and ‘in view of the circumstances’— as in () and ()— as having their usual
import and role: As on Kratzer’s stated view, these phrases are used to specify the
two main kinds of modal bases. By contrast,   stipulates that in cer-
tain examples with deontic modals, these phrases suggest something about what
ordering source is relevant (e.g., one like gsubj or gobj) and do so in unpredictable
ways. ere is no independent motivation I know of for this stipulation.
Second, -  better captures the common nor-
mative element in circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of ‘ought’. What
makes a normative modal the kind of normative modal that it is— e.g., rational,
moral, prudential, etc.— is the preorder with respect to which it is interpreted.
I- , unlike  , captures how it is a
constant set of values or norms that are used to assess the deontic betterness-making
features of acts and worlds in the interpretation of circumstantial and evidence-
sensitive readings of ‘ought’. (For instance, according to utilitarianism, the ordering
source implicated in both readings might be something like {Wemaximize expected
utility}, where “expectedness” is determined in light of the given modal base.) As
the ‘in view of the evidence’ and ‘in view of the circumstances’ phrases suggest, it is
simply the relevant body of information which changes (and which then interacts
with the relevant information-sensitive norm). is view also better illuminateswhy
various normative ethicists have thought to engage in the project of attempting to
analyze (in my terminology) circumstantial ‘ought’s in terms of evidence-sensitive
‘ought’s or vice versa. But if the ordering sources implicated in the interpretation
of both readings were logically unrelated in the manner suggested by 
, this project might seem to be conceptually confused.
ird, -  better captures the close semantic
connection between unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘ought’ sentences like () and
deontic conditionals like (). As suggested in §, evaluations of conditional ex-
See, e.g., B , pp. –, G a, pp. –, , pp. –, W-
 .

pected utility— expected utility given a condition—play an important role in ratio-
nal choice theory and decision making more generally. It would be surprising if we
could not express such evaluations in natural language. I-
, unlike  , captures how deontic conditionals like () can
express such evaluations—namely, by interpreting ‘ought’ with respect to the same
preorder selector that is used in interpreting unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘ought’
sentences. (ough, again, such sentences need not express judgments of expected
utility, and information-sensitive preorder selectors need not be consequentialist.)
Further,   seems to predict that there would be a kind of equivoca-
tion in accepting () and then accepting () upon learning that the way is clear.
() In view of the evidence, we ought to switch to the .
Whatever is going on in the successive interpretations of these sentences, it does
not seem that it is the ordering source that is changing. When we learn new factual
information— for example, that the antecedent condition of a deontic conditional
like () obtains—we can conclude something about what we subjectively ought to
do. (As we’ll see in the following section, even if the inference from () and its
antecedent condition to its consequent is not classically valid, it seems to be dynam-
ically valid.)
To bring this out, consider the following variant on our original case. e case
is the same as before except that now there are three ways we can get to the hospital:
we can stay along our current route, we can switch to Route , or a bit farther down
we can switch to Route . Route , like Route , has had construction on it lately, but
when it’s clear it is the fastest route to the hospital. (When it’s blocked, it’s as slow
as the .) We don’t know whether Route  is clear today, but our evidence strongly
suggests that construction work is done on the  and the  on the same days. Call
this case ‘ ’. e following conditional seems true:
() If Route  is clear, we ought to take Route .
On the condition that Route  is clear, switching to Route  is the expectably best
action. I-  captures this: the preorder is indexed
to our current information state updated with the information that Route  is clear.
Relative to this updated information state, our taking Route  is best. However,
suppose that unbeknownst to us, it turns out that Route  is clear but Route  is
blocked. en, since   interprets the ‘ought’s in deontic hypothetical
conditionals as having a circumstantial reading, or as taking an objective ordering
source, () is incorrectly predicted to be false. e lesson: e ‘ought’s in deontic

conditionals like () and () are not given objective or circumstantial readings.
ey are evidence-sensitive—or, better, evidence-sensitive on a condition.
In reply   could drop its claim that the ‘ought’ in a deontic hypo-
thetical conditional takes an objective ordering source. Instead it could claim that
the ‘ought’ is interpreted with respect to a sort of hybrid ordering source— in the
case of (), perhaps something like the following:
() gsubj∗(w) ={ the  is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,
the  is clear ⊃ we switch to the ,
the way is blocked ⊃ we stay put,⋮}
Given the sorts of assumptions discussed in the case of (), () will come out true
with respect to this ordering source. P  can indeed capture our new
data. But, as suggested above, it does so in such a way that leaves opaque the con-
nection between the norms used in assessing claims like (), (), (), and, now, ().
More pressingly,   is only the ĕrst of a long line of more complex cases in
which, roughly, what is objectively best comes apart from what is expectably best,
which comes apart from what is expectably best on one condition, which comes
apart from what is expectably best on another condition, and so on. For each eval-
uation of what is expectably deontically best on a given condition C, for variable
C—and for the interpretation of each associated hypothetical conditional—wewill
need a new ordering source. It is plausible that a theory that uniĕes these ordering
sources and treats context as making a uniform contribution to the interpretation
of all such conditionals (and their unembedded, evidence-sensitive counterpart) is
to be preferred. I-  does just that.
So, even if   is empirically adequate, there are good reasons for
thinking that -  yields the better overall theory.
 Information-sensitivity and modus ponens
So far, so good. But as the reader may have noticed, there is a perhaps surprising
feature about the joint consistency of certain of our examples, reproduced below:
Modus ponens is violated. (What is at issue here is the validity of modus ponens for
the indicative conditional, not, e.g., the truth-functional material conditional.)

() a. We ought to stay put. (⇒ It’s not the case that we ought to switch to
the .)
b. If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
c. e way is clear.
e recent treatment of deontic conditionals in K&MF  has
made much of this point. ough they consider a more complicated case involving
constructive dilemma, this is unnecessary. e violation ofmodus ponens is evident
even in non-hypothetical contexts, as in (). at modus ponens fails is unsurpris-
ing given our semantics (cf. K & MF , pp. –). First,
though it might be true that the way is clear, the epistemicmodal base for the unem-
bedded ‘ought’ in (a) need not encode this information. Since deontic preorders
can be sensitive to what the set being preordered is like, the mere truth of a propo-
sition, together with the truth of an associated conditional ‘ought’, won’t entail the
conditional’s modalized consequent. Second, since the consequent of a hypotheti-
cal conditional is interpreted with respect to its local context, the deontic preorder
is sensitive to the information expressed by the antecedent in a way that aﬀects the
modal’s domain of quantiĕcation. So, the sentences in (), even when the ‘ought’s
are given the same reading without equivocation, can all be true with respect to a
constant global context. (I assume that it is this notion of validity—which requires
interpretation with respect to a constant global context— that is relevant for the
evaluation of a logical argument for a particular conclusion.)
Cf. K& L ,  F , , L& L , pp. –.
More formally:
(i) ; : : : ; n ⊧  iﬀ for all contexts c∶ JKc ∩ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∩ JnKc ⊆ JKc
It is worth noting that denying an information-sensitive semantics of the sort described in § won’t
allow one to hold on tomodus ponens for the indicative conditional— at least if one accepts a Kratze-
rian restrictor analysis for conditionals: such an analysis doesn’t validatemodus ponens anyway (pace
suggestions in D ). Simple countermodels with and without the postulation of a covert
higher modal:
Proof. Overt modal restriction: Suppose w is the world of evaluation, f(w) = {w;w}, w is a(∧ )-world, w is a (¬∧¬ )-world, and w <w w. en ‘’ is true (since w is a -world), and
‘If , ought  ’ is true (since w, the ≲w-best -world in f(w), is a  -world), but ‘Ought  ’ is false
(since w, the ≲w-best world in f(w) is a ¬ -world).
Proof. Covert modal restriction: Let f be the modal base of the covert higher modal and f ′ be the
modal base of the overt lower modal. Suppose w is the world of evaluation, f(w) = {w;w},
f ′(w) = {w}, f ′(w) = {w}, w <w w, w is a ( ∧ ¬ )-world, and w is a ( ∧  )-world. en
‘’ is true (since w is a -world), and ‘If , ought  ’ is true (since w, the ≲w-best -world in f(w)
and the ≲w-best world in f ′(w), is a  -world), but ‘Ought  ’ is false (since w, the ≲w-best world
in f ′(w), is a ¬ -world).

But if modus ponens fails in this way, can we still account for how, in practi-
cal deliberation, we can legitimately detach unembedded evidence-sensitive ‘ought’
claims from associated conditionals upon learning that the latter’s antecedent condi-
tion obtains? Yes: Although modus ponens is not (neo)classically valid, modus po-
nens inferences like the ones we are considering are dynamically valid. Roughly,
for a set of premises to dynamically entail a conclusion, it must be that when the
premises are successively asserted (and accepted), the context set of the evolving
context is included in the proposition expressed by the conclusion in that evolved
context. In assessments of dynamic validity, premises not only play their usual
classical role of ruling out possibilities; they also change the context, and hence in-
formation state, with respect to which subsequent sentences are interpreted.
Informally, suppose we start in a context that leaves open whether the way is
clear. I assert (), which is successfully added to the common ground.
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
Next, I learn that the way is clear and so assert ().
() e way is clear.
Since () is not only true but is also accepted, the context set is reduced to worlds
where the way is clear. But this updated context is precisely the one relevant in the
interpretation of the consequent of ()! So, the resulting context set entails— is a
subset of— the proposition expressed by ().
() We ought to switch to the .
anks to Dilip Ninan for noting an error in a previous version.
Compare the notion of a “reasonable inference” in S , an important inspira-
tion for much work in dynamic semantics. See W  for elaboration on the importance of
a dynamic notion of logical consequence in logics and semantics for information-sensitive deontic
modals. A related but importantly diﬀerent notion is Kolodny and MacFarlane’s notion of “quasi-
validity” (, pp. –). Roughly, an argument is quasi-valid iﬀ it is (neo)classically valid
when its premises are epistemically necessary. As Kolodny and Macfarlane show, modus ponens is
quasi-valid. However, asWiller observes (p. n.), a notion of quasi-validity may havemore limited
importance since it does not apply in hypothetical reasoning and fails to capture certain intuitively
valid forms of inference (cf. S ).
More formally (cf.  F , pp. –; G , pp. –):
(i) ; : : : ; n ⊧dynamic  iﬀ for all contexts c∶ JKc ∩ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∩ JnKc∣∣:::∣n−∣ ⊆ JKc∣∣:::∣n∣
I put this (contentiously) in terms of context change potentials merely for notational convenience.
See, e.g., G& S , B, , V , andM
 .  for discussion of various possible notions of dynamic entailment.

us, () and () dynamically entail (). More formally (cf. n. ):
Proposition . JIf  ; ought Kc;w = J Kc;w =  implies JOught Kc;w = , where c =
c ∩ JIf  ; ought Kc and c = c ∩ J Kc .
Proof. Suppose that JIf  ; ought Kc;w = J Kc;w = . So, by Deĕnitions  and ,∀w′ ∈ D (c ∩ J Kc;≲w; c∩ J Kc) ∶ JKc;w′ = . Suppose, plausibly, that updating with
‘If  , ought ’ doesn’t aﬀect the deontic preorder— i.e., that ≲w; c∩ J Kc= ≲w; c ∩ J Kc ,
indeed that D (c ∩ J Kc;≲w; c∩ J Kc) ⊇ D (c ∩ J Kc;≲w; c ∩ J Kc). Since J Kc = J Kc ,
D (c ∩ J Kc;≲w; c∩ J Kc) ⊇ D (c ∩ J Kc ;≲w; c ∩ J Kc). But c = c∩J Kc . So, it follows
thatD (c ∩ J Kc;≲w; c∩ J Kc) ⊇ D (c;≲w;c). So, since JKc = JKc ,∀w′ ∈ D (c;≲w; c) ∶JKc;w′ = .
In this way, in deliberation and conversationwe can legitimately detach claims about
what we ought to do— in the subjective, evidence-sensitive sense— from associated
deontic conditionals upon learning the truth of their antecedent conditions.
 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. On ĕrst glance it appeared that the standard Kratzer semantics
for modals was incomplete; it seemed to be silent on how to interpret claims about
what one ought to do in view of the evidence. While a quick ĕx was apparently
available—namely, allowing deontic modals to take epistemic modal bases—we
have seen that a more radical revision of Kratzer’s ordering semantics may be called
for. On the analysis defended here, modal bases do not simply restrict deontic pre-
orders; they help determine what the preorder is. By making the deontic preorder
information-reĘecting— indexed to a set of worlds—we can improve on 
  and   and give a uniĕed explanation for how changes
in modal base help generate circumstantial and evidence-sensitive readings of de-
ontic ‘ought’. e intended readings of deontic ‘ought’ conditionals follow from
the information-sensitivity of the preorder selector and independent principles con-
cerning local interpretation. e project here has not been to argue that no other
theory can get the data right. Rather it has been to motivate building information-
sensitivity into our semantics and articulate one way of doing so that is empirically
adequate and theoretically attractive.
By dropping philosophical assumptions that may have been implicit in Kratzer’s
original analysis, we have opened up new ways of generating the desired predic-
tions about various phenomena involving deontic ‘ought’. And we have done so in

a way that better captures the common core of the modals than we otherwise would
have. is, I take it, is an instance of a more general methodological lesson. e
linguist, like any other practicing scientist, oen comes to the theoretical table with
various implicit philosophical views. e acceptance of such assumptions can oen
inadvertently restrict the space of possible analyses to be given in response to new
data. By locating these assumptions, the philosopher of language can, among other
things, free up the linguist and help expand the range of candidate theories.

Appendix Evidence-sensitivity in DRT
I have argued that deontic preorders used in interpreting ‘ought’ can be sensitive to
what the modal base is like and how it is updated locally. Since Discourse Repre-
sentation eory (DRT) has been enormously fruitful in its treatment of sentence-
internal context updates, in this appendix I will formalize the more theory-neutral
analysis of information-sensitivity from § using DRT. Of course there will be al-
ternative implementations.
A DRT: Some background
A Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) represents the body of information
accumulated in a discourse. A DRS consists of a universe of “discourse referents”
(objects under discussion), depicted by a set of variables, and conditions that encode
information gathered in the discourse. Syntactically, algorithms map syntactic
structures onto DRSs. Semantically, DRSs are interpreted model-theoretically by
embedding functions—functions from discourse referents to individuals in a model
such that for each discourse referent x, the individual that x is mapped onto has
every property associated with the conditions on x. Truth is then deĕned at the dis-
course level rather than at the sentence level: roughly, a DRS K is true in a modelM iﬀ there is an embedding function for K inM that veriĕes all the conditions in
K. Diﬀerent types of conditions have diﬀerent veriĕcation clauses (see below).
A simple example should clarify. Take the single-sentence discourse ‘John killed
a miner’. e following DRS represents the information that there are two individ-
uals— John and a miner— and that the ĕrst killed the second.
()
j m
john(j)
miner(m)
killed(j, m)
An embedding function f veriĕes () in amodelM iﬀ the domain of f includes j and
m, and according toM, f(j) is John, f(m) is a miner, and f(j) killed f(m). Roughly,
Discourse referents can be understood as entities that can serve as antecedents for
anaphora— introduced non-linguistically or linguistically by indeĕnite NPs—modeled as con-
straints on assignment functions. ey needn’t correspond with referents in the model. See K-
  for classic discussion.

the DRS () is true in a modelM iﬀ there is an embedding function inM that
veriĕes all its conditions—here, iﬀ there is an embedding function inM such that j
can bemapped onto an individual in themodel, John, andm can bemapped onto an
individual which is aminer in themodel, such that the individual corresponding to j
killed the individual corresponding tom. e universe of this DRS is {j;m} and the
condition set is {John(j), miner(m), killed(j;m)}. is DRS forms the background
context against which subsequent utterances are interpreted.
Modally quantiĕed sentences induce more complex DRSs. For concreteness,
I will follow the DRT analysis of modals in F . As contexts are oen
represented in dynamic theories of interpretation in terms of sets of states—sets
of world-embedding function pairs ⟨w; e⟩—Frank, following G , intro-
duces context referents that denote such sets. Update conditions G∷ F+K′, from an
input context referent F with a DRS K′ to an output context referent G, are used to
represent the dynamic meaning of sentences in a discourse. A bit of terminology:
Deĕnition . A Discourse Representation Structure (DRS) K is an ordered pair ⟨UK =
UKind ∪UKcont ;ConK⟩, where UKind is a set of variables, UKcont a set of context referents, UK
the universe of K, and ConK a set of conditions.
Deĕnition . An embedding function f for K in an intensional modelM is the union
of an embedding function f and an embedding function f, where:
. f for K inM is a (possibly partial) function from UKind into D.
. f for K inM is a (possibly partial) function from UKcont into sets of states ⟨w; f⟩.
For embedding functions f and g and DRS K, g extends f with respect to K—written
‘f[K]g’— iﬀ Dom(g) = Dom(f) ∪UK and f ⊆ g.
A modal’s nuclear scope— the DRS representing its prejacent— is treated as
anaphoric to an antecedent context referent that is updated with the restrictor. (is
is intended to capture, among other things, Kratzer’s notion of relative modality,
or the claim that modals are interpreted relative to a contextually supplied set of
premises.) is anaphoric analysis yields the following general logical form for
modals Q (depicted with a diamond) in (), relative to an anaphoric context refer-
ent X′, restrictor DRS K′, scope DRS K′′, and context referents G′ and G′′.
See also P ,  R . Cf. S , , B , B
, which analyzemodal quantiĕers in terms of discourse referents for static, rather than dynamic,
objects, e.g., sets of possible worlds.

()
X′ G′ G′′
X′ = ?
G′ ∷ X′+ K′ Q G′′ ∷ G′ + K′′
ere are a number of ways to render the computation of the modal’s domain of
quantiĕcation information-reĘecting. Here I will do so by treating the denotation of
a deontic context referentD as a function from a set of worlds (an information state)
to a set of states, those states consistent with what is deontically required in view of
that information state. For ease of exposition I abstract away from details involv-
ing Kratzer’s ordering source and treat a deontic modal’s modal base as complex,
consisting of a merged context R + D, where R is the relevant “realistic” (circum-
stantial, epistemic) context. Speciĕcally, I assume that the complex modal base B is
formed from the merge of a realistic context R and a deontic context D that takes
R as argument: B = R + D(R). e denotation of B determines the set of worlds
(e(B)) = (e(R)) ∩ (e(D)(e(R)))—i.e., the set of worlds consistent with the
relevant body of facts or evidence and what is deontically required relative to the
information state determined by that body of facts or evidence. e set of worlds
(“context set”) ( ) determined by a set of states   is given as follows:
Deĕnition . ( ) = {w′∶ (∃x′)⟨w′; x′⟩ ∈  }, for a set of states  
Some relevant veriĕcation conditions (see, e.g., F ,  E&K
, K  .  for fuller treatments):
Deĕnition . For all worlds w, (well-founded) embedding functions e; f; g;h with do-
mains in UK, intensional modelsM, DRSs K;K′;K′′; and sets of conditions Con:
. e truth-conditions of a DRS K inM:
(a) JKK⟨w;f⟩ = {⟨w; g⟩∶ f[K]g& ⟨w; g⟩ ⊧M K}
(b) A DRS K is true inM iﬀ ∃f∶ ⟨w; f⟩ ⊧M K
. e context change potential of a DRSK inMw.r.t input and output states ⟨w; f⟩,⟨w; g⟩:
⟨w;f⟩JKK⟨w;g⟩ iﬀ f [K] g& ⟨w; g⟩ ⊧M K
. Veriĕcation of a DRS K inM by embedding function e:⟨w; e⟩ ⊧M ⟨K⟩ iﬀ ∃f∶ e[K]f& ∀c ∈ ConK∶ ⟨w; f⟩ ⊧M c

(a) ⟨w; e⟩ ⊧M Pn(x; : : : ; xn) iﬀ ⟨e(x); : : : ; e(xn)⟩ ∈ I(Pn)
(b) ⟨w′; e⟩ ⊧M G ∶∶ F+⟨K′⟩ iﬀ e(G) = {⟨w′; g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′; f⟩ ∈ e(F) s.t. ⟨w′;e∪f⟩JKK⟨w′;g⟩}&∃⟨w; g⟩ ∈ e(G)
(c) ⟨w; e⟩ ⊧M G ∶∶ X′ + ⟨K′⟩ ◇every H ∶∶ G + ⟨K′′⟩ iﬀ
e(G) = {⟨w′; g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′; x′⟩ ∈ e(X′) s.t. ⟨w′;e∪x′⟩JKK⟨w′;g⟩}&
e(H) = {⟨w′;h⟩∶ ∃⟨w′; g⟩ ∈ e(G) s.t. ⟨w′;e∪g⟩JKK⟨w′;h⟩ &∀⟨w′; g⟩∶ ⟨w′; g⟩ ∈ e(G)→ ∃⟨w′;h⟩ ∈ e(H)}
(d) ⟨w; e⟩ ⊧M G = F +D(F) iﬀ
e(G) = {⟨w′; g⟩∶ ∃⟨w′; f⟩ ∈ e(F) ∃⟨w′;d⟩ ∈ e(D)(e(F)) s.t. ⟨w′; g⟩ =⟨w′; f ∪ d⟩}
B e data
Turning to our data, ĕrst let’s analyze (), our evidence-sensitive unembedded de-
ontic ‘ought’. e (partial) DRS for () will be roughly as in (). Let F be the con-
text that encodes our evidence; D encode what is deontically required; and  be the
empty context that begins the discourse, where e() = {⟨w′; ⟩∶w′ ∈ W} and  is
the empty function.
() We ought to stay put.
 F G D
F ∷ + x group(x)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F +D(F)
G′ ∷ X′+ every G′′ ∷ G′+ stay-put(x)
e le-hand subordinate box is empty since the modal’s domain is already re-
stricted by virtue of being anaphoric to the prior context F. Importantly, what is
deontically required anaphorically depends on the realistic context F. e complex
modal base X′ = F + D(F) restricts the modal’s domain of quantiĕcation to worlds
I assume a syntacticized version of Kratzer’s semantics for modals, though nothing here hinges
on this. Also, our DRSs are merely partial representations, so not all conditions encoding our evi-
dence or the relevant circumstances are given in the representations that follow.

that are consistent with the available evidence and what is deontically required rela-
tive to this evidence— i.e., to worlds in (e(F))∩(e(D)(e(F))). Accordingly ()
is true iﬀ in all of these worlds, we stay put. More generally, the modal condition
in the DRS updating F is veriĕed iﬀ every state in the denotation of X′ can be ex-
tended to a state that veriĕes the scope DRS stay-put(x) . Since the deontic context
is sensitive to what the epistemic context is, this modal condition is indeed veriĕed.
Now reconsider our circumstantial ‘ought’ in (). e DRS for () will be much
like that in (); however, the modal’s restriction will be anaphoric, not to F, but to
F∗, a context referent that encodes the relevant facts about the situation.
() We ought to switch to the .
 F∗ G D
F ∷ + x group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F∗ +D(F∗)
G′ ∷ X′+ every G′′ ∷ G′+ switch(x; a)
So the context set of the denotation of F∗ includes only worlds where the  is clear.
Since the deontic context D is sensitive to this, the modal condition, evaluated with
respect to the complex modal base X′ = F∗+D(F∗), is veriĕed. We switch to the  in
all worlds in the context set of the denotation of X′—i.e., all worlds in (e(F∗)) ∩
(e(D)(e(F∗))).
Turning to (), in order to capture how the ‘ought’ is interpreted with respect
to its local context, we need to ensure that the deontic context merges with the up-
dated modal base that includes the condition encoded by the ‘if ’-clause in forming
the modal’s complex modal base. So, the DRS in () will not provide the correct
representation of (). e problem is that the complex modal base X′ = F +D(F) is
formed before the context is updated with the restrictor DRS clear(a) .

() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
 F G D
F ∷ + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F +D(F)
G′ ∷ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∷ G′+ switch(x; a)
So, if we are to correctly represent the intended readings of deontic condition-
als like () within our current semantic framework, we may need to posit a covert
necessity modal that scopes over, and is restricted by, the ‘if ’-clause. (Alternative
frameworks may not require this move.) As brieĘy mentioned in §, such a move
has much independent support— e.g., in light of data with anankastic condition-
als, nominally quantiĕed ‘if ’- and ‘unless’-sentences, and ‘might’-counterfactuals—
though, for reasons of space, I will not rehearse those arguments here (see n. ).
Suﬃce it to say that this independently motivated element helps yield the accurate
representation of () in ().
() If the way is clear, we ought to switch to the .
 F G D
F ∷ + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∷ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F
G′ ∷ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∷ G′ +
H′ H′′ X′′
X′′ = G′ +D(G′)
H′ ∷ X′′+ every H′′ ∷H′+ switch(x; a)
e modal base X′ of the covert modal is anaphoric to the context referent F that
encodes the available evidence (see §§–). e complexmodal baseX′′ of the overt
deontic ‘ought’ is identiĕed with the update of X′ with the DRS representing the ‘if ’-

clausemergedwith the deontic context— i.e.,X′′ = G′+D(G′). Crucially, this allows
the information-sensitive deontic context D to interact with the context referent G′
that encodes the condition that the way is clear, rather than with F, which does not.
So the embedded ‘ought’ quantiĕes over worlds in which the way is clear that are
consistent with the evidence andwhat is deontically required relative to this updated
information state. Accordingly, the modal condition in G is veriĕed; we switch to
the  in all worlds in (e(X′′)).
Finally, a brief word about the ‘even if ’ conditional in (). Independent con-
siderations from F  suggest that in modalized ‘even if ’ conditionals, the
embedded modal’s modal base is anaphoric to the non-updated context referent
X′ = F, rather than to the updated contextG′ as in ()— in Kratzerian terms, to the
higher modal’s modal base f(w) rather than to f+(w). is is represented in ().
() Even if the way is clear, we ought to stay put.
 F G D
F ∶∶  + x a group(x) the_(a)
G ∶∶ F +
G′ G′′ X′
X′ = F
G′ ∶∶ X′+ clear(a) every G′′ ∶∶ G′ +
H′ H′′ X′′
X′′ = X′ +D(X′)
H′ ∶∶ X′′+ every H′′ ∶∶ H′+ stay-put(x)
If this position on ‘even if ’ conditionals is right, we have an independently moti-
vated way of predicting the appropriate truth-conditions for (). As in (), what is
deontically required is calculated relative to the non-updated information state that
encodes our actual evidence.
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